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Abstract
Whilst carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies are now in the demonstration phase, they are still characterised
by a range of technical, economic, policy, social and legal uncertainties. This paper presents the results of an
interdisciplinary research project funded by the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC). The aim of the project was to 
analyse the main uncertainties facing potential investors in CCS and policy makers wishing to support these
technologies through demonstration to commercial deployment. The paper presents a framework for the analysis of 
these uncertainties, and applies this framework to nine analogue case studies of CCS. These case studies have focused
on historical developments in technologies and/or policy frameworks where one or more of these uncertainties has
been prominent and have, in most cases, been partly resolved. The paper also shows applies the insights from these
historical case studies to develop three potential pathways for CCS deployment in the UK over the period to 2030.
Finally, the paper concludes with some implications for CCS policies and strategies.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier  Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of GHGT 
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1. Introduction
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies are often highlighted as a crucial component of future
low carbon energy systems. However, they are still being developed and demonstrated. It is therefore
unclear when these technologies will be technically proven at full scale, and whether their costs will be
competitive with other low carbon options. For their supporters, CCS technologies offer a crucial way to
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square the continued use of fossil fuels with climate change mitigation. According to the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy Outlook in 2011, fossil fuels will continue to supply the majority of 
[1]. 
 global energy system trajectory that has a significant chance of limiting average 
temperature increases to 2°C. Under this scenario, CCS would be fitted to 32% 
power plant capacity (410GW out of 1270GW) by 2035, and 10% of global gas fired capacity (210GW 
out of 2110GW) by the same date. CCS technologies would therefore account for 22% of the reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions would continue to rise.  
However, whilst many governments and companies are now funding and developing CCS 
technologies, there is a long way to go before we know whether such a role for CCS will be technically 
and economically feasible. Pilot scale capture plants are in operation in several countries, CO2 is routinely 
transported across large distances in the United States, and CO2 is being injected successfully at a number 
of storage sites. But full-scale CCS plants are thin on the ground [2]. Demonstrations so far focus on gas 
processing, synthetic fuels and fertiliser production  applications that are less technically demanding and 
into a power plant increases the levelised cost of the electricity produced by between 39% and 64%, 
[1, p378]. This increase is expected for two main reasons. 
First, the incremental capital costs of adding CCS to a fossil fuel power plant are substantial. Second, the 
energy penalty of including carbon capture in a power plant is significant.  
Given these economically unattractive attributes, it is not surprising that there are no full scale CCS 
demonstrations in operation at coal- or gas-fired power plants. The first two are currently under 
construction in the United States and Canada, underpinned by government financial support. Plans for a 
number of other CCS power plants have recently been cancelled, including the Longannet plant in 
Sc nschwalde plant in Germany. Whilst economic and financial factors were significant 
in the collapse of Longannet nschwalde followed public protests against the 
planned use of onshore storage. The Global CCS Institute emphasises the particular importance of 
economic and policy barriers to such demonstration projects in a recent survey report [2]. 
The important role that CCS technologies could play has been recognised in recent UK policy debates. 
A commitment to government funding for full-scale demonstrations was made as long ago as 2007. Since 
then, progress has been slow. The original competition to build a demonstration project has not led to a 
firm agreement with project developers, and ended with the Longannet cancellation in Autumn 2011. In 
April 2012, a renewed policy push was made with the launch of the 
, and a CCS roadmap [3]. The government confirmed that £1billion of capital funding will be 
available for one or more demonstration projects, supplemented by long term contracts from an ongoing 
reform of the UK electricity market, and funds from the NER300  process.  
Against this background, this paper summarises the findings of the two-year UKERC research project: 
Carbon capture and storage: realising the potential? [4]. The aim of the project was to conduct an 
independent, inter-disciplinary assessment of the technical, economic, financial and social uncertainties 
facing CCS, and to analyse the potential role CCS could play in the UK power sector between now and 
2030. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains how the main uncertainties 
for CCS were identified, and how they can be assessed. Section 3 summarises the nine case studies that 
were used to explore these uncertainties, each of which focuses on a technology that is partly analogous to 
CCS. Based on the insights from the case study analysis, section 4 develops a number of potential CCS 
pathways for the UK to 2030. It also suggests a number of important branching points, where decisions 
could make a significant difference to the contribution of CCS plants to the future UK electricity mix. 
Section 5 concludes and sets out some important implications for policy and for other decision makers. 
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2. Analysing the key uncertainties for CCS technologies 
The identification of key uncertainties for CCS technologies was an iterative process. An initial list of 
uncertainties across a range of technical, political, financial, legal and social aspects was drafted by the 
project team. The research process drew on the inter-disciplinary expertise on CCS and innovation within 
the research team, which includes geology, engineering, legal and financial and innovation studies. The 
draft list of uncertainties was further refined and tested in an iterative process with several steps. In line 
with contemporary technology assessment practice [5, 6], this process included consultation with the 
ange of experts from industry, policy and academia.  
A social science literature review was undertaken in June 2010 to establish what is known about CCS 
uncertainties, as well as more fundamental insights about how to conceptualise and understand them [7]. 
We found that existing social science CCS publications tend to focus on a particular uncertainty such as 
public acceptance [8] or costs [9]. They do not tend to analyse CCS uncertainties across the board and 
their interactions over time. Where there was little social science research, for example on system 
integration, general innovation studies and policy literature were used. To further focus and ground the 
framework in an understanding of how new technologies are assessed in practice, 14 interviews with 
technology stakeholder representatives from the public and private sectors were conducted. The 
interviews were further complemented with a review of technology assessment documents.  
The final list of seven key uncertainties for CCS innovation is presented in Table 1. They are 
elaborated in more detail in Markusson, Kern et al. [7]. As shown in the Table, qualitative and 
quantitative indicators were identified so that uncertainties could be assessed with more precision.  
3. Historical analogues for CCS 
Faced with the inherent uncertainties about the future of a new technology, it is common to draw on 
our experience of previous technologies that are analogous in some way. This happens both informally in 
discussions as well as through formalized comparisons in the development of designs, policies and 
strategies. A few previous studies have sought to use historical analogues to assess the potential future 
development of CCS technologies. Studies of CCS learning rates have tried to quantify the rate of 
learning experienced by mature technologies such as flue gas desulphurisation (FGD). They use this 
evidence to argue that CCS might develop similarly, with costs falling as CCS technologies are 
progressively deployed [9, 10]. There is also some qualitative research that compares CCS with other 
technologies, which is useful for exploring a wider range of innovation processes than can be compressed 
into a learning rate. This paper adds to this second tradition of qualitative research. In comparison with 
previous studies such as that by Chalmers et al [11], the paper includes a more in-depth analysis of a 
wider range of analogue case studies. 
The historical analogues included in this study were chosen to be similar to CCS with respect to one of 
the seven uncertainties outlined in section 2. It is important to note that any analogue is necessarily 
different in some ways and can only ever be partial. This means that learning from analogues is never 
perfect. To make sure that the analogues were well chosen, a long list was first drafted, drawing on 
existing literature, stakeholder interviews and the inter-disciplinary research team. The draft list was 
further developed through a stakeholder workshop that included attendees from industry, government and 
academia. The workshop also included a prioritisation process to help the team identify the most 
promising analogue cases, taking into account factors such as their relevance, coverage and research team 
resources. The analogues were also selected to cover the whole CCS chain. The project team subsequently 
used the workshop outcomes to agree a final shortlist of nine analogue case studies, each of which covers 
a defined time period (see Table 2). The research for each case study was carried out using a combination 
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of literature reviews and, in some cases, a few expert interviews to fill gaps in the published data and 
analysis. 
Table 1. Uncertainties and indicators 
Key uncertainty Indicators 
1. Variety of pathways 
The diversity of technological options represents an 
uncertainty because early selection might accelerate 
development, but risks locking in weak technologies. 
- Number of technology variants 
- Relative importance of variants for technology developers 
- Market share of technology variants 
- Extent of lock-in / dominance of particular technology variant 
2. Safe storage 
There is uncertainty as to whether geological storage of 
CO2 will be secure over long time periods, and whether 
storage risks can be reliably assessed and managed. 
- Availability of storage site data, including agreed robust 
estimates of their capacity 
- Nature of legal / regulatory framework to share risks / liabilities 
- Levels of public awareness / acceptance of risks 
3. Scaling up and speed of development and deployment 
There is uncertainty about whether and how fast CCS 
technologies can be scaled up and developed to maturity. 
- Unit size, capacity and efficiency 
- Speed of unit scaling 
- Cumulative investment / installed capacity 
- Relative importance of market niches 
4. Integration of CCS systems 
It is unclear how CCS systems will be integrated. 
Integration is a technical challenge, as well as an issue of 
organisation and governance. 
- Whether full chain integration has been achieved? 
- The allocation of responsibility for integration 
-  
- Nature of development, including roles of key actors and the 
directed development  
5. Economic and financial viability 
The future cost and financial risk of implementing CCS 
are very uncertain. The economic and financial 
uncertainty is heavily dependent on policy. 
- Costs, including assessment of quality of cost data 
-  
- Role of subsidies, other forms of economic / financial support, 
and other sources of finance (shared with uncertainty 6) 
6. Policy, politics and regulation 
CCS development is strongly influenced by uncertainties 
about extent of political support, as well as the choice and 
design of policies and regulations. 
- Nature of legal / regulatory framework to share risks / liabilities 
- Role of subsidies, other forms of economic / financial support, 
and other sources of finance (shared with uncertainty 5) 
- Role of other forms of policy support 
- Extent of political commitment / legitimacy 
7. Public acceptance 
Public acceptance may be crucial to CCS development. 
Attitudes to CCS are shaped in social interaction. 
- Levels of public awareness / acceptance of risks 
- Specific manifestation of public opposition (or support) 
- Quality of public engagement 
Table 2. Analogue case studies 
Uncertainty Historical analogue case studies 
1. Variety of pathways  The French Nuclear Programme, 1950s-1980s 
2. Safe storage  The management of radioactive waste in the UK, 1956-2011 
3. Scaling up and speed of development and deployment   -2000 
Flue Gas Desulphurisation in the USA, 1960s-2009 
4. Integration of CCS systems Natural Gas Network in the UK, 1960-2010 
5. Economic and financial viability Flue Gas Desulphurisation in the USA, 1960s-1970s 
Investments in landfill in the UK, 2001-2011 
6. Policy, politics and regulation    Flue Gas Desulphurisation in the UK, 1980s to 2009 
7. Public acceptance Natural gas infrastructure development in the UK, 2000-11 
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Each case is briefly described below. Full details can be found in case study reports which are available 
on the research project websitea.  
3.1. Variety of pathways 
This uncertainty has been analysed through a case study of the development and deployment of nuclear 
power in France from the 1950s-1980s. The French nuclear programme is widely seen as a successful 
example of a large scale, rapid roll-out of a standardised design [12]. In the 1950s, a variety of different 
reactor designs were available internationally [13]. The case analysed the process by which this initial 
variety was reduced to one dominant design. This case is a partial analogue for the possible development 
of CCS as there is currently technological diversity for each of the components of the CCS chain. 
According to insights from the innovation studies literature, competition among technology variants is 
normal and beneficial for learning, but will most likely be reduced as technologies get nearer wide 
deployment. There is uncertainty as to what technologies will win out and when that will happen. This 
raises questions about when to support a diversity of designs and when to prioritise specific variants.  
Initially, in France, a domestic design of gas-cooled graphite reactors (GCR) was developed, but 
subsequently the French opted for an American pressurised water reactor (PWR) design, which also 
became dominant globally. Later, France also invested significant resources into the development of a fast 
breeder reactor (FBR), which was never commercialised. The history of the French nuclear programme 
illustrates that technological variety can be reduced by policy, albeit with significant risks if it is not 
 rather than economic 
factors played a key role in the process of choosing the design for the French nuclear roll-out. Thereafter, 
standardisation contributed to lower costs and shorter construction times compared to other countries. 
3.2. Safe storage 
This uncertainty has been analysed with the help of one case study: the management of radioactive 
waste in the UK. Radioactive waste (RW) management is used as an analogue for the safe storage of 
carbon. In both cases, the indefinite disposal of waste poses long-term environmental risks. The case study 
focused on four aspects of RW management: site selection, operational and accident liability and public 
acceptance. Two previous attempts at selecting sites for the geological disposal of RW foundered, while a 
third attempt is ongoing. The initial approaches were almost exclusively based on expert judgement of the 
technical feasibility with little public input and transparency and they faced substantial public opposition. 
The ongoing third attempt uses an approach suggested by the Committee on Radioactive Waste 
Management where local communities volunteer to host the repository, and continued public engagement 
is seen as key in building trust in the selection process. Operational liability refers to the financial costs of 
RW management and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. Liability arrangements changed over time as 
the nuclear industry changed from public to mainly private ownership. Whereas under public ownership 
no particular arrangements were made, segregated, external funds have been established under private 
ownership to cover the long term liabilities [14]. Arrangements for liabilities for nuclear accidents in the 
ted and 
insurance is voluntary. Nuclear liability, in contrast, is strict and channelled to the operator. Liability 
insurance or financial security is mandatory and the overall liability of operators is capped. Safety 
 
See http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/tiki-index.php?page=ES_RP_SystemsCCS  
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perceptions have a major impact on acceptance of nuclear energy. Surveys indicate that many people feel 
poorly informed about RW and have little trust in government and the nuclear industry [15]. 
3.3. Scaling up 
This uncertainty was explored with the help of two case studies: the development of combined cycle 
gas turbine (CCGT) power plants (between 1900 and 1980s) and their rapid deployment in the UK in the 
1990s, and the development and deployment of flue gas desulphurisation technology (FGD) in power 
plants in the US between the 1960s and 2009. Both technologies have been substantially scaled up in 
terms of the size of individual units and they have also been rolled out in substantial numbers. 
The analysis of the combined cycle gas turbine showed the long time frame involved in scaling up the 
technology to a size of relevance for the power sector. The development from the first industrial CCGT 
plants to a competitive power sector technology in the 1990s took about 30 years. It required long-term, 
sustained R&D investment by the heavy equipment manufacturers (General Electric, Westinghouse, 
Siemens and ABB). Sales in niche markets enabled re-investment of revenues in R&D. Technological 
development also profited from sustained public R&D investment in the development of jet engines. The 
analysis showed how a variety of factors contributed to the surge of deployment of the technology in the 
1990s. The rapid roll-out is explained by changes in economic conditions (e.g. the availability of cheap 
gas), policy factors (e.g. the introduction of competition in the electricity sector and stronger 
environmental regulations) and technological developments (efficiency improvements and scaling up). 
Competition between the manufacturers led to downward pressure on costs. 
The analysis of FGD in the US showed that the technology went through a period of relatively rapid 
scaling up and development in the 1970s, and has later exhibited bursts of rapid investment activity and 
wide roll-out. FGD systems went through a fivefold scale up over a period of 30 years. A modular 
approach facilitated the relatively rapid early scaling of the overall FGD plants of 2.5 times over 5 years  
and even faster for some technology variants, with scrubber unit sizes increasing more slowly. 
Deployment was driven by a range of different policy approaches over time, including emissions 
performance standards, (implicit) technology mandates and sulphur emissions trading. After a stable build 
rate in the 1970s, a markedly uneven rate of build can be observed in the 1980s onwards, with peaks of 
several 10s of GWs installed in some years. At times, this caused worries about the ability of industry to 
scale-up its capacity quickly enough. Part of the reason why this has worked is the international nature of 
the FGD equipment market that has smoothed out overall demand. Towards the end of the period studied, 
about industry capacity bottlenecks forming. 
3.4. System integration 
This uncertainty was explored with the help of a case study on the transition of the system for gas 
provision in the UK from town gas to natural gas, during the period from 1960 to 2010. The study was 
chosen as an analogue for the challenges of integrating large, infrastructural technical systems. From 1960 
to the mid-1980s, the gas infrastructure was under nationalised governance with the Gas Council as the 
dominant actor. The introduction of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from 1964 facilitated the later conversion 
from town gas to natural ga
introduction of LNG created several challenges, including the higher pressure needed for natural gas, the 
conversion of burners in domestic appliances and the need for new expertise. The introduction of North 
Sea gas from the late 1960s drove a change process, in which resilience and flexibility were sought, and 
provided by interconnections, storage and new control technologies. The period from the mid-1980s 
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brought privatisation and market liberalisation, and a multitude of actors contributing to the development 
of the system. From the late 1990s, the depletion of North Sea resources led to a renewed emphasis on gas 
imports  and a simultaneous rise in political debate about the security of UK gas supplies. The need to 
expand imports led to large scale investments in new pipeline interconnectors and LNG import terminals.  
3.5. Economic and financial viability 
We chose two cases to shed light on economic and financial uncertainties: the storage in landfill sites 
of waste in the UK from 2001 to 2011; and flue gas desulphurisation in the United States in the 1960s and 
1970s. Landfilling of waste is considered as a suitable regulatory analogue to carbon storage because both 
activities raise questions about the long-term environmental risks and associated liabilities of dealing with 
waste streams. Landfilling also has a number of operational characteristics which make it similar to 
carbon storage (for example a long aftercare phase after operations have stopped). The EU CCS directive 
was directly modelled on the EU landfill directive. Whilst landfill was previously the cheapest waste 
management solution, it has come under intense regulatory pressure due to limits imposed by the EU 
landfill directive.  There have been no investments in new sites since the directive was implemented in 
2001. The UK government therefore introduced a number of instruments to reduce the amount of waste 
being sent to landfill. New void space, where necessary, has been created through an extension of existing 
sites. The financial provisions for monitoring and aftercare are not perceived as an important obstacle to 
new investments by operators. 
balance sheets, especially when they operate multiple sites. The focus of the case was widened to include 
other investments in waste management infrastructure such as recycling and energy-from-waste plants. 
Key risks for these influencing the economic and financial viability of such investments include: off-take, 
waste stream, technology, policy and planning risk. It is argued that carbon storage faces similar risks. 
The case study on flue gas desulphurisation (FGD) technology in the United States covers the mid-
1960s to the late 1970s; the period when the technology began receiving serious attention and investment. 
The first large scale FGD plant was built in the late 1960s. Based on that and other evidence, regulators 
introduced an emissions performance standard in 1971. The government also supported the technology 
through funding R&D, establishing test centres and sharing data. Litigation created policy uncertainty and 
delayed investments, but ultimately the standard stood up against the challenges. Subsequent regulation 
enacted in 1979 was more stringent and effectively mandated FGD. FGD costs rose five-fold in the period 
studied, and they subsequently fell substantially in the 1980s. The increases were due to unforeseen 
technical problems and the challenges of technology transfer from other sectors. This rise in costs was 
much bigger than predicted at the time when the first large plant came on line. Financial risk was not a 
key problem for the investing utilities, since they operated in regulated, regional monopoly markets and 
were allowed to pass on abatement costs to their customers.  
3.6. Policy, politics and regulation 
This uncertainty has been explored through a case study of FGD technology deployment at power 
plants in the UK between the early 1980s and 2009. This analogue was selected because FGD deployment 
is dependent on policy and regulation, and policies to support FGD in the UK have been subject to 
significant uncertainty and controversy. During the 1980s international concerns about acid rain began to 
drive policy discussions about sulphur emissions abatement in the UK. The EU adopted the Large 
Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) in 1988 which included limits on these emissions. The LCPD has 
had significant impacts on FGD investment in the UK, but this has also been a politicised process. Whilst 
the EU promoted emissions reductions and the use of FGD, the UK government and industry resisted 
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abatement investments that were considered too costly. Therefore, FGD investments were made but were 
delayed. More recent EU regulations which mandate closure of unabated fossil fuel plants by 2015, 
together with financial incentives under the second phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, have 
stimulated a rapid increase in investment. By 2008, power sector SO2 emissions had been reduced by 94% 
compared to 1980 levels as a result of fuel switching (from coal to gas), the use of lower sulphur coals, 
and the introduction of FGD. The overall UK FGD investment programme cost £1.4-1.8bn in 2011 prices. 
3.7. Public acceptance 
This uncertainty was explored with the help of a case study on the public acceptance of the 
development of natural gas infrastructures in the UK between 2000 and 2011. This case was selected 
because natural gas infrastructure development is similar to the transport infrastructure needed for CCS, 
particularly pipelines and compressor stations. The study includes the use of salt and brine fields for 
underground gas storage (UGS), the development of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals with above-
ground storage tanks and the construction of pipelines (and pressure reduction installations) to connect 
new facilities with the national gas transmission system. The case is also relevant because recent 
investments in onshore gas pipeline and storage infrastructure in the UK have been accompanied by local 
protests and opposition, with some material impacts on project outcomes. 
4. CCS pathways to 2030 
A set of pathways was developed for CCS from now to 2030, drawing on CCS policy documents, 
research literature and the insights gained from the analogue case studies. The pathways were analysed 
with the help of the uncertainty indicators listed in Table 1. For each uncertainty and assessment indicator, 
the pathways were compared at five-year intervals to see where they differ. These differences were 
identified as branching points between pathways [16].  
A set of three pathway end-points for 2030 were selected, which differ widely in the amount of CCS 
deployed. These endpoints represent situations where we have either (1) reached the more ambitious 
policy targets for CCS deployment (and where virtuous cycles have led to the resolution of many 
uncertainties; (2) a situation where a moderate level of deployment has emerged and the success of the 
have led to a multiplication of uncertainties).  
To be able to elaborate the possible events leading to each of these endpoints, a back-casting approach 
was adopted [17]. During the course of this back-casting analysis, the second pathway was expanded into 
two variants in order to illustrate the trade off involved in early or late selection of technology variants 
(and a number of other closely related issues). The pathways are deliberately agnostic with regard to CCS 
plant fuel and technology choices because the main aim was to focus on the insights from the case studies. 
Full descriptions of each pathway, including the wider energy system and policy context for each, can be 
found in Heptonstall, Markusson et al. [18]. The pathways are: 
 
deployment. By 2030, CCS has an established position as a technically proven and financially viable 
option, and is competitive with other low-carbon electricity generation technologies. 
 -scale demonstration of CCS goes ahead, and is 
followed quickly by further deployment up to the mid-2020s. By this time, CCS has established itself 
as technically viable, but from the mid-2020s onwards it is not generally a preferred option as part of 
the low-carbon generation mix in the UK. Financial viability ends up being marginal. 
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 -scale demonstration of CCS does go ahead, 
followed by limited further deployment up to 2030. CCS has established itself as technically viable, 
but it is not generally a preferred option as part of the low-carbon generation mix in the UK. Financial 
viability remains marginal with deployment in particular market niches only. 
  
 
The deployment of CCS plants within each pathway is summarized in Figure 1 together with the four 






















Fig. 1. Pathways for CCS in the UK to 2030  
Branching Point #1 represents a choice between strong, comprehensive early policy support or a more 
result of political will being too weak, or through 
moderate level of policy support and moderately successful development work, which  with a 
combination of luck and prudent planning  could lead to a deployment in specific market niches the late 
2020s. Branching Point #3 illustrates that there is a need for sustained progress to avoid the pathway 
grinding to a halt in the 2020s. Leftmost in Figure 2 
strongest momentum, through all the uncertainties improving. The final branching point, Branching Point 
#4, suggests that if early progress is achieved through cutting of too many corners and premature selection 
of technology variants, there is a risk of a backlash in the (late) 2020s and momentum being lost. 
 
 




























Fig. 2. Pathways for CCS in the UK to 2030 with branching points 
5. Conclusions and policy implications 
CCS technologies continue to face multiple uncertainties. Recent events in the UK and abroad 
reinforce the need to analyse these uncertainties, and possible ways in which they could be overcome. The 
UK government has continued its commitment to CCS, and has re-launched its demonstration 
programme. But at the time of writing, this has not yet resulted in a firm agreement to fund a specific 
demonstration project. The cancellation of Longannet has shown some of the challenges of securing 
financing for large-scale CCS projects [19]. The spotlight has now shifted to other CCS projects that are 
bidding for support within the new CCS commercialisation programme. Despite continuing public 
commitments to CCS from the government, and the publication of the CCS roadmap, policy uncertainties 
are likely to remain a particular concern for investors.  
In view of these persistent uncertainties and the slow progress with demonstration projects, what 
insights can our research offer for policy and other decision makers? There are some important general 
lessons. First, our historical case studies show that uncertainties can be reduced sufficiently for progress to 
be made. In some cases, they can be resolved entirely. This offers some optimism that, given the right set 
of circumstances, the uncertainties that affect CCS can also be dealt with over time. However, we have 




Comprehensive policy support, including comprehensive programme 
of storage site characterisation, thorough public engagement and 
network design modifications to prepare for future CO2 grid? 
Yes, and the demo 
programme also 
proceeds well 
Slow and sporadic (PW2B)  
CCS is feasible in favourable market niches. 
Despite achieving technical viability  it has 
only marginal financial viability .  A few 
new CCS projects may proceed in the 
2030s.  
Failure (PW3) 
No momentum built following very 
limited support and/or at least one 
show stopper  issue arising.  
No Middle path 
with some 
policy support 
CCS progresses, but there is an 
extended period of experimentation and 
hesitation.  In general, costs do not start 




key issues are 
resolved and some 
progress is made in 
fits and starts 
Alternative route to Failure 
Key issues are not resolved 
and CCS, therefore fails to 
progress further before 2030. 
CCS gains momentum and a 
second tranche of projects 
enters operation by the early 
2020s 
As operating experience is gained at 
commercial-scale plants (and the 
outcome of other actions also becomes 
clearer), policy-makers and other key 
actors decide whether CCS should play 
a significant role in their portfolio for the 
forseeable future (to 2030/2035 and 
perhaps somewhat beyond) 
Momentum lost (PW2A)  
Installed capacity in 2030 is similar to the 
slow and sporadic  pathway, but further 
CCS projects in the 2030s are unlikely. 
Unforeseen problems (e.g. a public 
backlash, leaking storage and ever 
rising costs make CCS unviable.   CCS is now technically and 
financially viable (probably still 
with appropriate policy support) 
On-track (PW1)  
Installed capacity continues to rise with 
significant further tranches of plant 
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current situation in the UK. It is important to consider the limitations revealed by the analogues in relation 
to CCS, as well as the lessons they can teach us. 
A second general conclusion is that interactions between uncertainties matter. They can reinforce each 
other, both positively and negatively. There can also be trade-offs between uncertainties where attempts to 
resolve one uncertainty could result in the exacerbation of others. This reinforces the need for a systemic 
analysis of emerging technologies such as CCS, to complement more specific research on particular 
technical, economic, policy and social issues. In section 4 of this paper, we have highlighted how 
particular trade-offs between uncertainties can make a significant difference to outcomes for CCS. The 
variants of pathway 2 explore some of the risks of a strong policy that pushes technology development 
down a specific route  and how this strategy may lead to a backlash, and an eventual stalling of progress. 
A third lesson is that the resolution of all uncertainties is not required for CCS to be financeable in the 
UK. Similarly, the derailing of plans to realise the potential of CCS may not require everything to go 
wrong  but this could be caused With respect 
to emerging technologies like CCS, it is tempting to feel that all risks must be dealt with by government 
before progress can be made. But that assumption is mistaken, and forgets that the private sector routinely 
deals with multiple risks. If new low-carbon technologies such as CCS are to be deployed, the role of 
policy frameworks is not to remove all uncertainties, but to identify those risks that would not be tackled 
in the absence of intervention. 
discussed in -this paper describes how many of the uncertainties facing 
CCS could be resolved -, we have stressed that it is not meant to be prescriptive. The reality of support for 
CCS in the UK is likely to be much less straightforward. Our analysis has highlighted difficult choices 
that have to be made by government and other decision makers, especially in the following four areas: 
1. Keeping options open or closing them down? Whilst strong policy signals and support are required 
for CCS, there are also risks associated with accelerated innovation and deployment. It is tempting to 
focus resources on one technological variety early on as the French government did with the PWR for its 
nuclear programme. This may help to speed up development, but comes with increased risks of picking 
inferior technology. It is too early for government and industry to close down on a particular variant of 
CCS technology. Several substantial demonstration projects are needed, for example so that uncertainties 
associated with scaling up and system integration can be tackled. 
2. Which public policy incentives for CCS demonstration and deployment? A menu of options is 
available for public policy support of CCS technologies. A regulatory approach will only work if 
technologies are sufficiently well developed and the additional costs can be passed on to consumers. CCS 
technologies are not yet at this stage. In the meantime, the government is right to emphasise the need for 
demonstrations. Public finance for these demonstrations should be designed to maximise performance 
rather than novelty. Since not all demonstrations are likely to perform as expected, systematic learning 
and evaluation by government is also essential. 
3. CCS deployment as a marathon, not a sprint. Our historical case studies show that developing new 
energy technologies can take a long time. Their costs do not necessarily fall from the first day they are 
deployed. Whilst learning can bring costs down, costs can rise for several years first as technologies are 
scaled up. Whilst this requires some patience, it is therefore important to monitor progress carefully to 
inform decisions on whether to continue with public funding  or, if there is little sign of positive progress 
over a prolonged period of time, when to divert resources to other options. 
4. Dealing with storage liabilities. Our case study of UK nuclear waste management policy has 
highlighted how complex liability arrangements for CO2 storage could be. For CCS, a balance needs to be 
struck between limiting liabilities for investors (so that they will be able to invest in full scale CCS plants) 
and protecting the interests of future taxpayers (who should not be un-necessarily exposed to liabilities). 
Agreements are therefore needed about how liabilities should be divided, when a privately run storage site 
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should revert back to the State, what arrangements are needed to fund potential liabilities, and what 
insurance site operators may require. The nuclear experience suggests that an independently managed 
fund may be required for carbon storage liabilities. 
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